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ABSTRACT

PROTECTING SENSITIVE CREDENTIAL CONTENT
DURING TRUST NEGOTIATION

Ryan D. Jarvis
Department of Computer Science
Master of Science
Keeping sensitive information private in a public world is a common concern to
users of digital credentials.

A digital credential may contain sensitive attributes

certifying characteristics about its owner. X.509v3, the most widely used certificate
standard, includes support for certificate extensions that make it possible to bind multiple
attributes to a public key contained in the certificate. This feature, although convenient,
potentially exploits the certificate holder’s private information contained in the
certificate.

There are currently no privacy considerations in place to protect the

disclosure of attributes in a certificate.
This thesis focuses on protecting sensitive credential content during trust
negotiation and demonstrates, through design and implementation, the privacy benefits
achieved through selective disclosure. Selective disclosure of credential content can be
achieved using private attributes, a well-known technique that incorporates bit

commitment within digital credentials. This technique has not been thoroughly explored
or implemented in any prior work. In this thesis, a protocol for issuing and showing
credentials containing private attributes is discussed and suggested as a method for
concealing and selectively revealing sensitive attributes bound to credentials during trust
negotiation. To demonstrate greater privacy control within a credential-based system,
private attributes are incorporated into TrustBuilder, an implementation of trust
negotiation. With access control at the attribute level, TrustBuilder gives users greater
control over their private information and can improve the success rate of negotiations.
TrustBuilder also demonstrates how credentials with private attributes can eliminate risks
normally associated with exchanging credentials, such as excessive gathering of
information that is not germane to the transaction and inadvertently disclosing the value
of a sensitive credential attribute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my Father in Heaven for answering my prayers and helping
me find my way in becoming who I am. I also would like to thank my wife, Tonya, for
all her wonderful support getting me through school successfully, my professor, Dr. Kent
Seamons, for hiring me as a research assistant in his Internet Security Research Lab at
BYU, and all my colleagues at school for assisting me throughout the journey. My
research was supported by DARPA through AFRL contract number F33615-01-C-0336
and through Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego grant number N6600101-18908.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
1.1.

Thesis Statement ................................................................................................. 2

1.2.

Organization of Thesis........................................................................................ 3

CHAPTER 2: FOUNDATION MATERIAL ..................................................................... 5
2.1.

Cryptographically Secure One-Way Functions .................................................. 5

2.2.

Public Key Encryption and Digital Signatures ................................................... 6

2.3.

Digital Credentials .............................................................................................. 7

2.4.

Bit Commitments and Private Attributes............................................................ 9

2.5.

Trust Negotiation .............................................................................................. 12

2.6.

TrustBuilder ...................................................................................................... 14

CHAPTER 3: SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE OF CREDENTIAL CONTENT ................ 17
3.1.

Selective Disclosure Design Goals ................................................................... 17

3.2.

Analysis of Private Attributes........................................................................... 18

CHAPTER 4: THE TRUST NEGOTIATION IMPLEMENTATION............................. 23
4.1.

Private Attributes within Standard Credentials ................................................ 23

4.2.

Creating and Communicating Private Attributes.............................................. 26

4.3.

Policy Compliance and Private Attribute Verification ..................................... 29

4.4. A Negotiation Strategy for Selective Disclosure.............................................. 33
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS.................................................................................................. 37
5.1.

Private Attribute Performance .......................................................................... 37

5.2.

The Impact of Private Attributes on Trust Negotiation .................................... 40

viii

CHAPTER 6: RELATED WORK.................................................................................... 43
6.1.

Crypto Certificates............................................................................................ 43

6.2.

Private Credentials............................................................................................ 44

6.3.

Database Pointer ............................................................................................... 45

6.4.

Smart Certificates ............................................................................................. 46

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK .................................................. 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................. 51
CHAPTER 8: APPENDIX ............................................................................................... 55
8.1.

Scenario Data.................................................................................................... 55

8.1.1

TrustBuilder Configuration Files.............................................................. 55

8.1.2

IBM TE Configuration Files..................................................................... 56

8.1.3

IBM TPL Policies ..................................................................................... 57

8.2.

Source Code...................................................................................................... 59

8.2.1

Pre-image Creator Tool............................................................................. 59

8.2.2

IBM TE External Function ....................................................................... 61

8.2.3

TrustBuilder Internal Source Code ........................................................... 63

8.2.4 TrustBuilder Test Interfaces ..................................................................... 66
8.2.5

TrustBuilder Eager Strategy Code ............................................................ 68

ix

TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Selective Disclosure .......................................................................................... 1
Figure 2 – A Credential containing Private Attributes being issued ................................ 11
Figure 3 – The Private Attribute Verification Process...................................................... 12
Figure 4 – Trust Negotiation Example.............................................................................. 13
Figure 5 – TrustBuilder..................................................................................................... 15
Figure 6 – Levels of Access Control................................................................................. 16
Figure 7 – The Pre-image ................................................................................................. 18
Figure 8 – X.509v3 Extension Composition..................................................................... 24
Figure 9 – The CA’s Verification Process........................................................................ 26
Figure 10 – Private Attribute Pre-image Creation ............................................................ 27
Figure 11 – A View of the Private Attribute Pre-image and its associated digest............ 27
Figure 12 – The TrustBuilder Implementation Architecture ............................................ 28
Figure 13 – Example TPL Policy without Private Attribute Support............................... 30
Figure 14 – Example TPL Policy with Private Attribute Support .................................... 31
Figure 15 – Attribute Level Access Control ..................................................................... 34
Figure 16 – Testing the Verification Time of Private Attribute Pre-images. ................... 39
Figure 17 – The Cost of Private Attributes in Trust Negotiation. .................................... 40

x

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Alice is an online shopper ready with her cart of items to check out from Bob’s
online store. Bob requires that Alice send him a digital credential containing her name
and email address before he will finish processing her online purchase. Alice agrees, but
the only credential she has with her name and email address also contains her social
security number and weight – attributes she is not willing to reveal to Bob. If Alice were
to disclose only her name and email address, Bob would not be able to determine if they
were certified by a trusted CA. Alice would prefer a method to let Bob have access to the
attributes he requires within a credential without having to disclose additional, irrelevant,
sensitive information in the same credential. Figure 1 illustrates the idea of Alice being
able to selectively disclose attributes in her credential while keeping sensitive attributes
private.

DL# 123-45-6789 Exp: 12/29/2004

DL# 123-45-6789 Exp: 12/29/2004

ALICE A. SMITH

ALICE A. SMITH

15 Doe St. , Provo, UT 84604
SS#: 111-11-1111 WT: 180 lbs
SEX:F Hair:Bwn Eye:Hazel
CLASS: A DONOR: Y
DATE OF BIRTH: 12/01/71

15 Doe St. , Provo, UT 84604
SS#: 111-11-1111 WT: 180 lbs
SEX:F Hair:Bwn Eye:Hazel
CLASS: A DONOR: Y
DATE OF BIRTH: 12/01/71

Figure 1 – Selective Disclosure. Alice A. Smith’s digital credential contains sensitive attributes that
Alice does not want to make public. Selective disclosure allows Alice to control access to her
attributes, and thereby protect the disclosure of her personal information.

A digital credential is the on-line analogue to the physical credentials that people
carry in their wallets. A credential contains attributes about the credential owner asserted
by the credential issuer, usually represented as name/value pairs. It is signed by the
issuer’s private key, and can be verified using the issuer’s public key. A credential may
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contain the public key of the owner, permitting the owner to use the corresponding
private key to answer challenges or otherwise demonstrate ownership of the credential.
Credential is a more general term for certificate. The most widely used certificate
standard is X.509v3, which supports an extension mechanism used to bind additional
attributes to the certificate owner within a single certificate. Unfortunately, this extension
mechanism is commonly used without privacy considerations and poses a threat to
certificates becoming convenient dossier builders.
Currently, only a few applications treat credentials as potentially sensitive. Westin
[25] defines privacy as “The right of individuals to determine for themselves when, how
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” An example of
the potential threat to personal privacy is demonstrated in [15] where VeriSign, a
certificate distribution company, is shown to have recently issued public credentials
containing sensitive demographics to an estimated three million users worldwide.
1.1.

Thesis Statement
This thesis focuses on the problems associated with protecting a user’s sensitive

credential content during trust negotiation and demonstrates, through design and
implementation, the privacy benefits warranted through selective disclosure. Selective
disclosure of credential content can be achieved using private attributes, a well-known
technique based on bit commitment [10], where a value may be committed to without
being immediately disclosed, but in the context of digital credentials. A protocol for
issuing and showing credentials containing private attributes is discussed and suggested
as a method for concealing and selectively revealing sensitive attributes bound to
credentials during trust negotiation. To provide greater privacy control within a
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credential-based system, private attribute support is incorporated into TrustBuilder, an
implementation of trust negotiation. With finer-grained disclosure policies, the new
TrustBuilder gives users greater control over their private information without requiring
additional real-time user interaction. In addition, the new TrustBuilder demonstrates how
credentials with private attributes can help successfully establish trust during trust
negotiation as well as eliminate certain risks normally associated with exchanging
credentials.
1.2.

Organization of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the foundation

material our research relies upon is introduced. Chapter 3 presents the design goals for
selective disclosure of credential content and an analysis of the alternative approaches. In
Chapter 4, the design and implementation incorporating selective disclosure of credential
content within trust negotiation for enhanced privacy protection is presented. Chapter 5
gives concrete examples of how selective disclosure benefits trust negotiation and
credential based systems, Chapter 6 contains the related works, and Chapter 7 finishes the
thesis with the conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER 2:

FOUNDATION MATERIAL

This section introduces the primitives that are important to protecting digital
information in open systems, including secure one-way functions, public key
cryptography, digital signatures, digital credentials, private attributes, trust negotiation
and an implementation of trust negotiation called TrustBuilder.
2.1.

Cryptographically Secure One-Way Functions
Cryptographic primitives are important to protecting digital information. The one-

way function is unique because of its mathematical nature of only being computable in a
single direction. In other words, with a strong one-way hash function it is
computationally infeasible to determine the original value given the ending result or
determine another value that will end up with the same result as the original. The result,
or digest, can act as a unique fingerprint for identifying the input without divulging the
input value. Digests are useful for proving ownership of digital information, representing
large amounts of data with a small fixed output and for being able to make commitments
to sensitive information.
The two most widely used standards for secure one-way hash functions are the
message-digest algorithm (MD5) and the secure hash algorithm (SHA-1). MD5 was
published as RFC 1321 in 1992 by Ron Rivest [17] and was the most widely used secure
hash function until recent brute force and cryptanalytic concerns arose. The MD5
algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces a 128-bit message
digest, processed in 512-bit blocks. SHA-1 was developed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) with its latest version FIPS PUB 180-1 published in
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1995 [11]. The SHA-1 algorithm takes as input a message with maximum length 264 and
produces a 160 bit message digest processed using 512-bit blocks as well.
2.2.

Public Key Encryption and Digital Signatures
Public key cryptography was initially proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [3]

and was a complete revolution in how encryption could be performed. The new system
was based on mathematical functions and operated using two separate asymmetric keys, a
private key and a public key. Unlike prior encryption schemes where the same key was
used to encrypt and decrypt, public key cryptography uses one key to encrypt and the
other key to decrypt. In the most widely used implementation of public key
cryptography, RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) 1978 [16], the encryption and
decryption keys can be used interchangeably. What the private key encrypts, only the
public key decrypts and what the public key encrypts only the private key can decrypt.
This feature is very useful for achieving certain aspects of confidentiality and
authentication.
A high level example of using public-key cryptography is as follows: Bob takes his
plain text love letter message and feeds it into the encryption algorithm using his
girlfriend Alice’s public key. The resulting cipher text is then sent from Bob to Alice.
Alice, upon receiving the cipher text feeds it into her decryption algorithm with her
private key. The resulting output is the original plaintext love letter, which only Alice
can enjoy.
If Alice needs to be sure that the letter comes from Bob, he can send the same love
letter again but also encrypted with his private key. When Alice receives the message the
second time, she feeds the cipher text along with Bob’s public key into the decryption
6

algorithm and then takes that output and feeds it again into the decryption algorithm
using her private key. If the output is the love letter, she knows it must be from Bob and
only she can read it. These examples show how public key cryptography can be used to
provide confidentiality as well as mutual authentication.
Private keys are often used to sign document digests to provide authentication and
integrity. If Bob really wanted Alice to know that the love letter was from him and it was
legitimate, he could have used his private key to sign a digest of the letter and send the
letter and the signed digest to Alice. This is similar to techniques used to create a
message authentication code (MAC) to validate the integrity of documents. Typically
signing the digest of a document with a private key creates what is called a digital
signature. Any person can verify the digital signature of a document by first creating its
original digest by feeding the document minus the signature into the same secure hash
function used, such as MD5 or SHA-1, decrypting the document’s signature with the
corresponding public key and comparing the two plaintext digests. If they match, the
signature is verified and the document has integrity. Achieving the properties of integrity
and authentication are crucial for the success of protecting sensitive credential content
during trust negotiation.
2.3.

Digital Credentials
Digital credentials are best described when compared to the physical credentials

people have in their wallets. Like a driver’s license, trusted third parties who certify
specific attributes about entities, or credential owners, issue the physical credentials we
carry in our wallets. In the case of a physical driver’s license, the Department of Motor
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Vehicles (DMV) acts as the trusted third party and certifies our name, age, eye color,
weight and possibly a social security number and vehicle restrictions.
The most universally accepted standard for digital credentials is currently the publickey certificate format: X.509v3. The initial version of X.509 was published in 1988,
version 2 was published in 1993, and version 3 finally approved as a standard in 1995 [9].
X.509v3 certificates contain the following fields [24]:
•

version

•

serial number

•

signature algorithm identifier

•

issuer name

•

validity period

•

subject name

•

subject public key information

•

issuer unique identifier

•

subject unique identifier

•

extensions

•

a signature on the digest created from all of the prior fields combined

Extensions are basically additional attribute placeholders in a certificate. It is possible to
have zero or more extensions and they can vary in size and number.
X.509v3 relies upon the association of public key certificates with users. The
certificates or credentials are assumed created by a trusted third party, known as a
Certificate Authority (CA). The certificate contains the public key of the subject, while
the corresponding private key is kept secret by the certificate owner and can be used for
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authentication and encryption. Certificates are typically revoked when a private key is
compromised by subjects or issuers. A list of certificates that are revoked is called a
certificate revocation list, and can be used and distributed to stop invalid certificates from
being accepted.
Certificates can also be constructed into chains denoting a hierarchical relationship
such as ACCREDITING BODY Æ BYU Æ STUDENT. In a certificate chain each
certificate’s signature can be verified using the public key of the parent certificate. To
completely verify the chain, the verifier will only need to have the public key of the root,
which in the last example was the accrediting body. This is a nice feature giving verifiers
the convenience of only having to store possible root keys instead of all public keys
needed for the complete verification of certificates. Certificate chains are very useful
when negotiating trust.
2.4.

Bit Commitments and Private Attributes
One design for creating attributes that can be selectively revealed as part of a

credential borrows directly from the idea of bit commitment [10] [18], which allows a
user to commit to a value without having to immediately reveal it. Thus, when sensitive
attributes in a credential are replaced with commitments to those values, we refer to those
commitments as private attributes.
Although the idea of using bit commitment within digital credentials is not new, the
approach has never been explored or implemented. Both Brands and Renfro make
observations about the technique. Brands [2] observed, “Another attempt to protect
privacy is for the CA to digitally sign (salted) one-way hashes of attributes…” and
Renfro [15] mentioned, “One approach is to append a nonce to the information in the
9

database and including the hash of the information and the nonce in the end-entity
certificate”. Both observations allude to the simple well-known technique we call private
attributes. The following issuing protocol describes an approach for issuing a credential
containing private attributes. It differentiates itself from the bit commitment protocol
given in [18] by using only a single random value and being used within the context of
digital credentials. There are minor variations to this basic protocol, but the protocol
presented is sufficient to demonstrate the general approach.
Suppose Alice requests that a credential be issued to her by a certifying authority
(CA). The typical arrangement is for Alice to construct a credential request that contains
the information to be included in the credential. Alice sends her request to a CA, who
verifies her sensitive attributes and returns a signed credential to Alice.
In the issuing protocol, Alice creates a credential request to be signed by the CA. She
will complete the following four steps for each sensitive attribute she wishes to remain
private within her credential.
1. Alice generates a random-bit string r.
2. Alice creates a pre-image p consisting of the sensitive value v she wishes to
remain private concatenated with r.
p= v|r

3. Alice generates a private attribute a1 by invoking a collision-resistant, one-way
function on the pre-image.
a1 = oneway(p)
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4. The commitment a1 to Alice’s sensitive value v is her private attribute to be
included as part of her credential request and stored in the signed credential in
place of v.

Pre-image 1

oneway (p1)

Pre-image 2

oneway (p2)

Pre-image n

oneway (pn)

Credential

CA

Figure 2 – A Credential containing Private Attributes being issued. Using a one-way-function, bit
commitments are generated from pre-images, p1 … pn, and placed into a credential request. The
digests represent commitments to sensitive attributes whose values cannot be determined without the
corresponding pre-images.

Alice submits the credential request to the CA, along with her corresponding preimages. The CA must ensure the pre-images are verified and that they correspond to the
commitments within the request.
The following is an example of a verification protocol, also shown in Figure 3, which
allows Alice to disclose private attributes selectively in her credential to Bob.
1. Alice sends Bob her digital credential that contains the private attribute a1, and
Bob verifies the credential.
2. When Alice determines that Bob is authorized to receive the value she committed
to, Alice sends Bob the original pre-image that contains the sensitive value v and
random-bit string r.
p= v|r
3. Bob calls a collision-resistant, one-way function on the pre-image to generate
commitment a2 using the same function that was used during the issuing protocol.
a2 = oneway(p)
11

4. Bob compares a2 with the private attribute contained within the credential. If
they match, Bob accepts the value v as Alice’s legitimate attribute value.
valid if (a1 == a2)

Pre-image 1

oneway (p1)

Pre-image k

oneway (pk)

Credential

Compare

CA

Figure 3 – The Private Attribute Verification Process. Taking the pre-images sent p1…pk, calling the
one-way function on them, and comparing the result to the corresponding commitment within the
credential verify a credential’s attributes.

This verification protocol demonstrates how Alice can prove to Bob, the verifier, the
original values of selected private attributes in her credential, as shown in Figure 3.
2.5.

Trust Negotiation
Private attributes can enhance privacy protection within credential-based online

applications. One application area that can benefit from private attributes is trust
negotiation, a new approach to establishing trust between strangers through the process of
iteratively disclosing digital credentials that describe attributes of the negotiation
participants [28]. This approach relies on access-control policies that govern access to
protected resources by specifying credential combinations that must be submitted to
obtain authorization.
A digital credential may contain sensitive information and its disclosure must be
carefully managed in accordance with an access-control policy that specifies which
credentials must be received before it can be disclosed. A credential is disclosed when its
12

access-control policy has been satisfied. Disclosure policies may govern access to all
sensitive resources, including credentials, roles, capabilities, policies, and services.

Alice

Bob

Visa Card Policy

Service Policy

1

2

Service

Service
Policy

Step 1
Step 2

2

Visa Card
Policy

Step 3
1

Step 4
Step 5

Service

Step 6

Figure 4 – Trust Negotiation Example. In this example, strangers Alice and Bob perform a trust
negotiation in which Alice obtains a service from Bob after exchanging policies and credentials. The
six steps are as follows: (1) Alice requests service from Bob, (2) Bob discloses his policy P2, (3) Alice
discloses her policy P1, (4) Bob discloses his BBB credential, (5) Alice discloses her Visa card
credential, (6) Bob grants service.

Figure 4 illustrates the following example of a trust negotiation. Alice wants a
service from a stranger, Bob, but Bob requires that she send him her Visa card credential
to access the service. Bob discloses an access-control policy to Alice to inform her of his
requirements to access the service. Alice will disclose her Visa card only to members of
the Better Business Bureau (BBB). She discloses her policy to Bob, who responds with
his BBB credential that he is willing to share with anyone. Next, Alice discloses her Visa
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credential. Since Alice is now authorized to receive the service, Bob grants her access.
Negotiations are currently based on access control decisions at the credential level.
Protecting sensitive credential content during trust negotiation, which provides finer
grained access control at the attribute level, will be discussed later in Chapter 4.
2.6.

TrustBuilder
Our current implementation of trust negotiation uses the TrustBuilder architecture [1]

[28] to conduct trust negotiation between security agents that mediate access to protected
resources, services, access-control policies, and credentials. The trust-negotiation
message protocol describes the ordering of messages and the type of information the
messages contain. The trust negotiation strategy is the mechanism that controls the exact
content of the messages, i.e., which credentials to disclose, when to disclose them, and
when to terminate a negotiation.
The TrustBuilder architecture is composed of three main components, as depicted in
Figure 5. The credential verification module checks the validity of each received
credential, verifies each credential signature, examines possible revocation, discovers any
credential chains, and answers challenges that require demonstrating credential
ownership. The policy compliance checker ensures that a local resource is disclosed only
to the other party after its policy has been satisfied and determines which local policies
are satisfied by the other party’s disclosed credentials. Finally, the negotiation-strategy
module takes a description of the current stage of the negotiation, including the party’s
local credentials and policies and all the credentials and policies disclosed in previous
rounds of the negotiation, and produce the next message to be sent to the other party.

14

Figure 5 – TrustBuilder. A representation of the TrustBuilder architecture mediating access to
credentials, access-control policies and services is depicted.

Access-control policies for local resources indicate which credentials are required
before access is granted. Each TrustBuilder agent is equipped with a policy-compliance
checker used for two main purposes. The first is for checking which incoming remote
credentials satisfy local policies. The second is for determining which local credentials
satisfy incoming remote policies.
Examples from our recent research in trust negotiation include support for sensitive
credentials and access-control policies [22], the definition and interoperability of trust
negotiation strategies [31], a trust-negotiation protocol based on an extension to TLS [7],
protecting privacy during trust negotiation [21], an analysis of policy languages for trust
negotiation [20], and the development of the TrustBuilder architecture for trust
negotiation [28].
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TrustBuilder provides support for sensitive credentials. Extending TrustBuilder to
support private attributes would allow support for selective disclosure of credential
content in trust negotiation. This fine-grained access-control would require that accesscontrol policies be associated with attributes of a credential instead of at the credential
level, as illustrated in Figure 6.
Credential Level
Access Control

Credential
Attribute 1

Policy P
Attribute 2

Attribute n

Attribute Level
Access Control

1

2

nn

CA’s Signature

Figure 6 – Levels of Access Control. Policy P is an access-control policy that protects a sensitive
credential, and constitutes credential level access-control. P1 – Pn are policies independently govern
access to each attribute and constitute attribute-level access control.
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CHAPTER 3:

SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE OF CREDENTIAL CONTENT

This chapter presents the design goals for selective disclosure of credential content
and provides an in depth analysis of how private attributes can satisfy these goals.
3.1.

Selective Disclosure Design Goals
This section presents general design goals for selective disclosure of credential

content. These goals will serve as a basis for evaluating different approaches to
safeguarding the privacy of credential content.
A credential that supports private attributes must exhibit:
1. Confidentiality – It is computationally infeasible to determine any information
about a private attribute from the credential itself.
2. Integrity – When the owner of the credential decides to reveal the actual value of a
private attribute, the owner must have to ability to convince the relying party the
value extracted from the private attribute pre-image is indeed the same value that
was certified by the CA.
3. Access Control – Private attributes in a credential are disclosed only at the
credential owner’s discretion.
4. Performance – The computational overhead required for issuing and verifying the
credential’s private attributes is not prohibitive.
5. Usability – It is feasible to integrate private attributes into existing credential
standards and systems that make use of credentials.
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3.2.

Analysis of Private Attributes
The confidentiality of the credential’s sensitive attributes is protected by the strength

of the one-way function and the construction of the pre-image. Appending a random bit
string to the attribute value (depicted in Figure 7) creates the pre-image. Using a fixedlength random bit string of 128 bits is sufficient to discourage dictionary attacks.
If random data are not appended to an attribute value, the attacker can iterate through
the range of possible attribute values to find a match. For example, if the Social Security
Number of the credential owner were stored in the credential as a private attribute
without any random data appended to the value, an attacker who has access to the
credential could simply iterate through all 109 possible social security numbers, invoking
the one-way function on the potential value to generate a commitment, and determine the
owner’s social security number whenever the resulting commitment matches the
commitment stored in the credential. Appending random data of 128 bits would increase
the cost of an attack to 2128 iterations for every possible attribute value, a prohibitive
amount for any attacker.
Pre-image
Attribute Value

Random Data

Figure 7 – The Pre-image. When creating the pre-image to appropriately protect against dictionary
attacks, random data should be appended to the actual attribute value.

The integrity of each attribute committed to within the credential is maintained by
the properties of the one-way function. In our case, the secure hash algorithm version 1
(SHA1) [24] is used, which takes a message of less than 264 bits in length and produces a
160-bit message digest. It is computationally infeasible to find collisions using a strong
one-way function. Thus it is highly improbable that a credential owner would be able to
18

generate an alternative pre-image with a different value than the CA certified and
successfully present it to a relying party.
The design of the pre-image must insure that there is no ambiguity between the
attribute value v and the random string r. For instance, either the random bit string could
have a predetermined fixed length, or there must be a distinct delimiter to accurately
distinguish between v and r.
The credential owner can enforce access control over sensitive credential attributes
by keeping the associated pre-images secure and disclosing them only to authorized
parties that are entitled to know the contents of a private attribute. This protection has
limits, because once an authorized entity has access to the pre-images, there is no
mechanism in the credential to prevent that entity from further disclosing the private
attribute. In addition, the verification protocol must be confidential in order to prevent an
eavesdropper from determining the private attribute. Incorporating private attributes in
trust negotiation permits the credential owner to maintain direct control of pre-images,
without requiring that personal information be stored in a centralized database.
The performance of private attributes can be analyzed in terms of both
computational overhead and storage requirements. In terms of computational overhead,
one-way hash functions such as SHA1 introduce minor computational demands when
compared to the much more expensive public key cryptography operations that are
required to sign a credential.
The storage overhead for private attributes is minimal, requiring the replacement of
the attribute value with a 20-byte commitment when using SHA-1. The storage
requirements of the digital signature in the credential are significantly greater than the
cost of a single private attribute. In some cases, a commitment may significantly reduce
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the size of a credential if a large attribute value, such as an image or biometric data,
should be stored in the credential. If the attribute is not always required when the
credential is in use, the space savings could provide motivation for a commitment,
independent of the privacy advantages.
In cases where multiple private attributes are stored in a credential and the space
requirements become an issue, it is also possible to represent multiple sensitive attributes
with a single commitment using Merkle hash trees [8], which can significantly reduce the
overall size of the credential by representing all private attributes with a single
commitment.
To create a Merkle hash tree, each attribute is processed through a one-way function
creating digests that will be the leaf nodes of the tree. Because the hash tree is a binary
tree, meaning each parent node has only two child nodes, every two leaf nodes are
combined, their values concatenated together, and processed through a one-way function
to create the parent. This process continues as a binary tree is built and a single root
result is used to represent all the attributes in the tree. It is then possible to disclose
selectively an attribute by disclosing the attribute and necessary one-way function results
in the tree to be used together for computing the root result and compare it to the root that
could be stored in the certificate.
The issuing and verification steps for supporting hash trees differ slightly from the
protocols introduced in this paper. The number of hashes required to create a hash tree
given n attributes is 2n, and the number of hashes required for verification is the depth of
the binary hash tree. The private attribute protocol presented earlier only requires one
hash for creation and a single pre-image for verification.
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The usability of private attributes will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. We show
that private attributes can be incorporated into X.509v3 certificates. A discussion of how
existing systems can be easily modified to support credentials that contain private
attributes is also presented.
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CHAPTER 4:

THE TRUST NEGOTIATION IMPLEMENTATION

Selective disclosure of credential content empowers individuals to determine for
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others. By incorporating selective disclosure into TrustBuilder, users can have control
over disclosing their credential’s sensitive content in an automated fashion. The
following six changes are required to support private attributes within a credential based
system, such as TrustBuilder.
1. Incorporating private attributes within standard digital credentials.
2. Providing a network message protocol for transporting private attribute preimages independent of their credentials.
3. Modifying policy compliance systems to verify private attributes and their
corresponding pre-images.
4. Associating disclosure policies with private attribute pre-images.
5. Creating a negotiation strategy that provides attribute level access control by
selectively disclosing sensitive private attribute pre-images.
The following sections in this chapter will detail the design and implementation of these
required modifications within TrustBuilder and its support infrastructure.
4.1.

Private Attributes within Standard Credentials
X.509v3 is the most widely used certificate standard. X509v3 certificate extensions

[14] make it possible to bind multiple attributes to a single certificate or public key,
which, although convenient, can potentially exploit the certificate holder’s sensitive
information in the certificate. There are currently no privacy considerations within
23

X.509v3 that protect the disclosure of attributes within a certificate. All attributes in a
certificate are as public as the certificate. Whenever a certificate is disclosed, so are its
sensitive attributes.
To counter this privacy vulnerability, any sensitive attribute normally embedded in an
X.509v3 certificate can be alternatively replaced with a private attribute committing to
the sensitive information (see section 2.4). Although additional overhead is required to
handle private attributes within digital credentials, simply storing private attributes within
X.509v3 certificates is straightforward.

Extension = SEQUENCE {
extnID
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical
BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING }
Figure 8 – X.509v3 Extension Composition. X.509v3 extensions are ASN.1 structures - a sequence
with three fields: extnID - the object identifier, critical bit - a boolean value, and extnValue - an octet
string.

X.509v3 extensions are ASN.1 structures, each containing an object identifier (OID),
critical bit, and octet string as shown in Figure 8. Normally an attribute value is placed
into the extnValue field as an octet string defined by its OID. An OID is used to identify
the content of the extension associating it with a type or a name allowing the ASN.1 octet
string value to be interpreted correctly. There are pre-defined public OIDs recognized by
most systems and custom internal OIDs only recognized by some systems. In order for
most applications to recognize a private attribute, a new OID could be registered to
represent a private attribute version of an already well-established type. For the
TrustBuilder implementation, custom OIDs were chosen for identifying private
attributes. In the future we may chose to register private attribute OIDs for general use.
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As far as being able to store private attributes within X.509v3 certificates, storing
private attributes is not any different than storing normal attributes within the extensions
of a certificate. When a certificate extension is used to store a private attribute, the OID
used must be understood by the application. The application can then verify and process
it appropriately.
The critical bit within an X.509v3 extension identifies it as critical or not. If it is set
to critical, it must be recognized or the certificate is invalid. The X.509 certificate
standard RFC 3280 [9] states that a certificate-using system must reject a certificate if it
encounters a critical extension that it does not recognize. According to the specification,
the critical bit can be set to false when the extension may not be recognized, such as the
case with a private attribute. By setting the critical bit to false, credentials containing
private attributes are backwards compatible and interoperable with existing credential
based systems.
No modifications are necessary to embed private attributes in X.509v3 certificates,
but in order to appropriately issue certificates containing private attributes several
additional steps are mandatory to verify the certificate. One possible approach for issuing
credentials containing private attributes is described in section 2.4. Using this approach,
the CA, in addition to the normal procedures performed when a CA verifies and signs a
certificate request, verifies each private attribute digest stored in the certificate.

Typically the certificate requestor sends a certificate request to the CA that already
contains the attribute data in the correct fields and only needs to be verified and signed by
the CA. If the CA were to accept this approach when issuing certificates with private
attributes, the CA would receive a certificate request with the private attribute digests
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already embedded. To verify that the digests in the certificate request correspond
correctly to valid pre-images, the certificate requestor would send the original pre-images
to the CA. To complete the verification, the CA would hash each pre-image and
compare each digest with the private attribute digest already embedded within the
certificate request as shown in Figure 9. If all digests match, and all extracted values
from the pre-images of the certificate are appropriate, the CA will sign the certificate and
return it to the certificate requestor.
Certificate
Request
Pre-image 1

oneway (p1)

Pre-image k

oneway (pk)
Compare

CA

Figure 9 – The CA’s Verification Process. Taking the pre-images sent by the certificate requestor
p1…pk, the CA calls the specified one-way function on them and compares each result to the
corresponding private attribute digest within the credential verifying the credential’s sensitive
attributes.

4.2.

Creating and Communicating Private Attributes
Creating private attribute digests and pre-images needed for certificate requests can

be completed with ease using Java’s security library. A program was developed that
takes the original plaintext attribute value, given as an argument or filename, and outputs
two text files, one containing the private attribute pre-image and the other containing the
Base64 encoded private attribute digest. The Java code responsible for creating the
private attribute pre-image is shown in Figure 10. The entire Java source code is in
section 8.2.1 of the appendix.
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//Create Random String for Pre-image
SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG");
random.setSeed((new Date().getTime()));
byte bytes[] = new byte[20];
random.nextBytes(bytes);
String randomStr = new String(bytes);
randomStr = new String(Base64.encode(bytes));
//Construct the Pre-image
String preimage = Value + ":" + randomStr.substring(0, 20);
System.out.println("Preimage created: " + preimage);

Figure 10 – Private Attribute Pre-image Creation. A secure random string is generated, Base64
encoded, and then truncated. The resulting 20 bytes of random data is appended to the original
attribute value. The strength of the pre-image is in the random data.

The pre-image text is placed into a file associated with the credential and
protected by the operating system. The file is an ASCII-based text file named after the
credential and formatted with a single name-value pair per line delimited by a tab
character representing the OID (name) to pre-image (value) relationship. Multiple preimages can then be declared for a single credential. The associated digests are placed as
extensions in the certificate request. An example of the pre-image and its associated
certificate extension digest is shown in Figure 11.
PREIMAGE:

SecretAgent:3QeJFkR6VDYVWy2ws0gEdBMrjh8=

Figure 11 – A View of the Private Attribute Pre-image and its associated digest. The example
certificate’s extension contains a private attribute digest visible in the Windows Certificate Viewer.
The associated pre-image used to originally create the digest contains the actual attribute value
“SecretAgent” followed by a separator and 28 bytes of random data.

Once a certificate contains private attributes, the associated pre-images will need to
be handled appropriately during the showing protocol. In order to maintain the
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relationship between the certificate extension and its pre-image, a simple network
message protocol can be used when transporting pre-images. Each pre-image message
can be a printable string containing a unique name, OID, and pre-image data with each
separated by a colon, and ending with a semicolon. In the implementation, the unique
name used is the Base64 encoded MD5 hash of the certificate, the OID is the number
string in ASCII typically used to denote the certificate extension, and the pre-image data
is the actual ASCII pre-image. This format provides a unique mapping that allows the
pre-images to be transmitted independent of their certificate.
One standard message protocol to exchange messages between a client and server on
the internet is HTTP, or HTTPS. TrustBuilder currently runs over HTTP(S) with both the
client and server independently communicating with their TrustBuilder Agents using
SOAP as shown in Figure 12. The necessary modifications that were made to

Figure 12 – The TrustBuilder Implementation Architecture. The web client’s HTTP requests are
handled through a trust proxy supporting trust negotiation. SOAP is used to communicate from the
application layers to the independent security agents, and all other messages between the client and
the server are over HTTP(S).

28

communicate private attribute pre-images included: adding a HTTP header called
“PREIMAGES=”, creating methods to extract pre-images from the HTTP header, and
methods to construct the HTTP header with the private attribute pre-image messages. The
existing SOAP communication only required minor modifications for it to include a
vector of pre-image message strings in the TrustBuilder method call.
4.3.

Policy Compliance and Private Attribute Verification
In trust negotiation, policy compliance is viewed as a black box that basically takes a

policy and a set of credentials as input and outputs a boolean value indicating whether or
not the policy is satisfied. Optionally, it may also output the set of credentials that satisfy
the policy. The compliance checker is critical for determining if a policy can be satisfied
and which credentials are relevant to the negotiation. See [20] for a complete list of
features recommended in a compliance checker for trust negotiation.
TrustBuilder supports the IBM Trust Establishment (TE) system. TE utilizes the
Trust Policy Language (TPL) developed by IBM for specifying policies that govern
resources and credentials. Example policies can be found in section 8.1.3 of the
appendix. TE also supports standard X.509v3 certificates as its credential format. TE
has a proprietary storage file format for the X.509v3 certificate private keys and
credential storage database, and requires several nonstandard certificate extensions to be
included in each X.509v3 certificate for valid use with its compliance checker.
TrustBuilder currently uses the TE policy compliance checker to determine whether
or not credentials satisfy a policy. Because the TE system is not open source, we were
unable to incorporate support for private attributes directly into the compliance checker.
If it were possible, we would modify the TE compliance checker to take additional
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arguments, such as the necessary pre-images needed to validate private attributes and
include the overhead necessary to process private attributes internally. The additional
steps required to support private attributes using the TE compliance checker necessitated
that the verification and evaluation be accomplished externally to TE.
The TE policy compliance system is built to either use standard type comparisons
defined directly in the policy or custom comparisons defined externally by a specified
Java class. The ability to customize the comparison of credential content in an external
class makes it possible to use the TE system for correctly verifying and comparing the
private attributes of credentials. The decision to use custom external classes prevailed
because TE had a history of success with TrustBuilder and there was no compliance
checker similar to TE, but whose source could be easily modified. In order for an
external class to be used during the compliance check, the class name and required
certificate parameters must be specified in the TPL policy. A portion of an example TPL
policy that defines a group and does not support private attributes is shown in Figure 13.
<GROUP NAME="SeniorStudent">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="University" ID="studentcert" TYPE="Student">
</INCLUSION>
<FUNCTION>
<EQ>
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="Status"></FIELD>
<CONST>Senior</CONST>
</EQ>
</FUNCTION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
Figure 13 – Example TPL Policy without Private Attribute Support. The policy includes a constraint
that the status field in the certificate must contain the constant value “Senior”.

In contrast, a segment of a policy for the same scenario that does support external
functions and uses an external class for a custom comparison is shown in Figure 14.

30

<GROUP NAME="SeniorStudent">
<!--TP-COORD=(10,300)-->
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="University" ID="studentcert" TYPE="Student"/>
<FUNCTION>
<EXTERN CLASS="PrivateAttributeExternalClass">
<PARAM NAME="privateAttribute">
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="Status"/>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="OID">
<CONST>1.2.3.6.1</CONST>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="valueEquals">
<CONST>Senior</CONST>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="subjectName">
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="subjectName"/>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="issuerName">
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="issuerName"/>
</PARAM>
</EXTERN>
</FUNCTION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>

Figure 14 – Example TPL Policy with Private Attribute Support. The parameters specified are
passed into the external class to be used to verify and evaluate private attributes.

In a nutshell, the TPL policy in Figure 14 states that in order to be a member of the
SeniorStudent group, the private attribute found at the OID 1.2.3.4.6.1 of the
certificate must evaluate to Senior in order to be valid. The policy refers to an external
Java class named PrivateAttributeExternalClass and specifies five
parameters to be sent into the external class through a series of method calls. The two
main functions in the external class are setParams() and eval(). The TE
compliance checker first calls setParams(), which initializes local variables within
the external class to the respective parameters. The parameters are as follows: the private
attribute digest, the OID, a custom comparison value, the certificate unique subject name
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and the certificate unique issuer name. Once each variable is set, the TE compliance
checker calls eval() which evaluates the private attribute within the credential.
The eval() function takes three important steps. It obtains the sensitive preimage from TrustBuilder, verifies the pre-image with its corresponding private attribute
within the credential, and decides whether or not the sensitive information contained in
the pre-image satisfies the policy.
The parameters specified by the policy provide identifying information to the
external function regarding the certificate, the evaluation criteria, and the private attribute
digest. The external function obtains the associated private attribute pre-images from
TrustBuilder using a static method which takes unique identification information of the
certificate in question, finds the correct negotiation session (in cases of multi-threaded
operation) and returns the certificate extension’s associated pre-image to the external
function, if it exists. The code for accessing pre-images can be found in section 8.2.3 of
the appendix.
Pre-image information can then be processed by the external class using the
protocol described in section 2.4. This protocol describes the process of verification and
evaluation that takes place in the eval() function. This function verifies a private
attribute by hashing its private attribute pre-image and comparing the result to the private
attribute itself. If the private attribute digests match, the original sensitive attribute value
is extracted from the pre-image and evaluated to see whether the attribute value satisfies
the trust requirements of the policy. A boolean value is returned to the compliance
checker affirming whether or not the extracted value met the policy’s requirements. The
external function code can be found in section 8.2.2 of the appendix.
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Because the compliance checker only determines if a set of credentials warrants
membership in a group specified by the TPL policy, it is up to the negotiation strategy to
determine if membership in a particular group merits access to protected resources such
as credentials, services and pre-images.
4.4.

A Negotiation Strategy for Selective Disclosure
The negotiation strategy determines the content of the messages sent to other

TrustBuilder systems and controls the disclosure of credentials and resources. The
“eager” strategy of trust negotiation can be summarized as negotiating trust by disclosing
unprotected and available credentials at each pass of the negotiation without ever
exchanging policies. Although both parties stay ignorant of the counterpart’s trust
requirements, if they present the right credentials to each other, they establish trust. The
first working implementation of trust negotiation completed by the Internet Security
Research Lab at BYU only supported the eager strategy. This eager strategy establishes
trust with the fewest number of exchanges and may prove to be a very efficient strategy
for establishing trust when supporting selective disclosure.
The eager strategy can be extended to support attribute level access control with
private attributes by determining which private attribute pre-images to disclose as shown
in Figure 15. The access control decision uses the compliance checker to determine
which credentials gain membership of a group specified by the policy. The negotiation
strategy handles the authorization and basically determines if membership to a particular
group merits access to protected resources.
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Credential
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Figure 15 – Attribute Level Access Control. Attribute level access control is accomplished by
associating policies with each sensitive attribute. During trust negotiation a sensitive value can be
disclosed once its associated access control policy is satisfied.

In the previous section example, the TrustBuilder Agent’s policy essentially states,
“In order to receive the senior discount service at the bookstore, you must prove senior
status at an accredited university.” This statement of authorization is what we call a role
expression and is explicitly defined in the TrustBuilder security agent’s configuration
file. This configuration file can express which resources are restricted, and to which
groups they are restricted to. An example configuration file for TrustBuilder can be found
in section 8.1.1 of the appendix. Written in XML format, the portion of the TrustBuilder
security agent’s configuration file that specifies a service access control policy is:

<SERVICE NAME="/senior_discount/books">
POLICY>SeniorStudent</POLICY>
</SERVICE>.

Describing the access control for credentials in XML is very similar to the access
control description for private attribute pre-images. The XML tags specific to pre-images
include the name (Name) - denoting the attribute name, the source file (SRC) - for the
pre-image file, and the extension identification (OID) - to uniquely identify the pre-image
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in the certificate. A sample portion of a TrustBuilder security agent’s configuration file
that specifies the disclosure policy for a private attribute pre-image is:
<CRED NAME="Student" SRC="demo/Certs/student.cer" SUPPORTING="false">
<PREIMAGE Name="Status" SRC="demo/Preimages/student.txt"
OID="1.2.3.6.1">
<POLICY>Company</POLICY>
</PREIMAGE>
</CRED>

An approach for determining which credentials to disclose using the eager strategy is
to iterate through the local credentials and check whether their associated disclosure
policy is satisfied. If a credential’s disclosure policy is satisfied, the credential is added to
the vector of credentials to disclose. A check is then performed on the credentials to be
disclosed and those credentials that had been previously disclosed, to determine which
pre-images should be disclosed. The credentials and private attribute pre-images can be
disclosed are placed into the negotiation response message, which is communicated to the
other party. The complete negotiation strategy code is provided in section 8.2.5 of the
appendix.
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CHAPTER 5:

RESULTS

This Chapter discusses how the size of credentials and the performance costs to
process credentials is affected by private attributes. In addition, we also explore the
impact private attributes have on trust negotiation.
5.1.

Private Attribute Performance
Private attributes affect credentials by replacing extensions normally containing

sensitive plain-text attribute values with private attribute digests. Each digest is currently
a fixed length of 160 bits (20 bytes) corresponding to the output of the SHA-1 hash
function. The binary output bytes are Base64 encoded to be represented as a printable
string extending the 20 binary bytes into 28 ASCII bytes.
Private attributes affect the size of credentials and introduce an additional flow of
private attribute pre-images which may altogether increase network traffic. Certificate
extensions normally containing sensitive plain-text attribute values are replaced with
private attribute digests. The certificate size may increase or even decrease depending on
the original attribute’s size. Each private attribute digest is a fixed length of 160 bits (20
bytes) corresponding to the output of the SHA-1 hash function. The binary output bytes
are Base64 encoded to be represented as a printable string extending the 20 binary bytes
into 28 ASCII bytes. Thus each attribute would be replaced by a 28 byte string.
Typically, X.509v3 certificates are nearly 1,000 bytes in size. As stated in section 3.2,
private attributes may increase or decrease the size of the certificate based on the size of
the data the private attribute digest represents. If the 28 byte private-attribute digest
represents a sensitive 200,000 byte JPEG picture, the size of the credential would be
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decreased by 2 orders of magnitude, a substantial savings in network bandwidth and
credential storage when a negotiating party does not require the JPEG pre-image
associated with the certificate’s private attribute. In general, the cost of storing
credentials is only decreased when the sensitive data corresponding to the privateattribute digest is large and not necessary for every transaction. The cost for storing and
distributing credentials is decreased or increased based on whether the sensitive attribute
value is greater or less than the 28 byte digest.
The Java code for creating SHA-1 digests from pre-images is in section 8.2.1 of the
appendix. The cost of creating private attribute digests is directly related to the cost of the
one-way hash function used, which in this case is the cost of using the SHA-1 algorithm.
The time it takes to create a 160-bit digest from a private attribute pre-image using SHA1 on a Pentium 4, 1.8 GHz processor, with 512 Mb RAM averages around 10
milliseconds using a 131072 byte input as shown in Figure 16.
Assuming the average size of an attribute placed inside an extension of a certificate is
less than 32 bytes, the creation and verification of that digest would cost less than .12
milliseconds on average to compute. Adding the hash function overhead of .12
milliseconds into a typical trust negotiation round time, the verification of pre-images
becomes negligible as shown in Figure 17. If a private attribute pre-image is large in
comparison to normal attributes, such as a JPEG picture file, latency will be introduced
during pre-image message transmission and the verification of the corresponding private
attribute digests within the certificates.
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Private Attribute Verification Times
Attribute Value
Size (in bytes)
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
128
256
512
1024
2048
4096
8192
16384
32768
65536
131072

Time to complete 1000
iterations of SHA-1
(in milliseconds)
120
120
120
120
120
120
121
133
140
165
180
241
390
671
1201
2323
4627
10355

Average time to create a
single SHA-1 digest
(in milliseconds)
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.121
0.133
0.14
0.165
0.18
0.241
0.39
0.671
1.201
2.323
4.627
10.355

Figure 16 – Testing the Verification Time of Private Attribute Pre-images. The SHA-1 hashing
method is used to create digests from pre-images to verify certificates during trust negotiation. The
pre-image digest creation times are charted.

In Figure 17, we evaluate the cost of handling private attributes in trust negotiation,
comparing it to a non-private attribute trust negotiation consisting of the same number of
negotiating rounds. Each test measured the time it took from the HTTP request to the
HTTP response using the HTTP implementation. On average, the cost of using private
attributes was an additional 3 hundredths of a second, showing the time to complete a
single trust negotiation with private attribute support to be negligible.
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The Cost of Incorporating Private Attributes into Trust Negotiation

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Max
Min
Average

Without
Private
Attributes
5.25
5.24
5.26
5.27
5.23
5.22
5.25
5.19
5.24
5.21

With
Private
Attributes
5.26
5.26
5.26
5.3
5.28
5.28
5.25
5.27
5.25
5.24

5.27
5.19
5.236

5.3
5.24
5.265

*Time is measured in seconds

5.5
5.45
5.4
5.35
5.3
5.25
5.2
5.15
5.1
5.05
5
1

2

3

4

5

Without Private Attributes

6

7

8

9

10

With Private Attributes

Figure 17 – The Cost of Private Attributes in Trust Negotiation. The graph and data show the
contrast between identical scenarios involving the same number of rounds of trust negotiation; one
test of trust negotiation over HTTP with private attribute support and the other without, showing the
cost to be negligible.

5.2.

The Impact of Private Attributes on Trust Negotiation
Supporting private attributes in trust negotiation furnishes credential holders with

attribute level access control. This fine-grained access control helps to protect users from
inadvertently disclosing their sensitive information. Selective disclosure of credential
content using private attributes can help some trust negotiations succeed when previously
they failed, and succeed faster in scenarios where the sensitive information is not
necessary for the negotiation.
Suppose that Alice, an online shopper, has chosen several items to purchase and is
ready to check out from Bob’s online store. In order to establish the trust necessary for
the transaction, Bob and Alice agree to negotiate trust. Bob requires that Alice send him
a digital credential containing her name and email address before he will finish
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processing her online purchase request. Alice has a digital credential with her publicly
available name and email address, but the credential also contains her social security
number and weight, information that Alice considers sensitive. Without private
attributes, all her attributes are stored in plain text within the credential and the disclosure
policy is based on the sensitive information it contains, which in this case is the
information not relevant to the transaction. Additionally, without private attributes, a
credential’s disclosure policy is logically composed of the conjunction of all its
attributes’ disclosure policies. If Bob cannot satisfy the trust requirements for the
credential, the negotiation will fail. If Bob satisfies the trust requirements for the
credential, he will receive Alice’s weight and social security number, even though that
information is not relevant to the transaction.
With attribute level access control, trust negotiation has the potential to increase its
success rate and performance. This can be accomplished when sensitive attributes of a
credential are hidden and the credential’s disclosure policy is less restrictive, allowing it
to be disclosed at an earlier stage of the negotiation. Using private attributes also allows
Alice to hide the sensitive attributes within the credential and separate the policies
governing the credential from the policies governing the credential’s sensitive attributes.
The credential’s access control policy is less stringent, allowing Bob to access the
credential and process the purchase request without inappropriately accessing Alice’s
sensitive information.
Selective disclosure of credential content empowers individuals to determine for
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others during trust negotiation. Both the client and the server communicating in a trust
negotiation have the capacity to protect and selectively reveal their sensitive information.
41

Trust negotiation is better equipped to succeed when possible using only the information
that is relevant to the transaction. Thus the information that is collectively exchanged
encompasses all the information required and nothing else. The usual irrelevant and
extraneous information that typically escapes during transactions is not permitted to
penetrate the fine-grained barrier of attribute level access control. This level of control is
essential to protecting user privacy and discouraging the misuse and inappropriate access
of private information.
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CHAPTER 6:

6.1.

RELATED WORK

Crypto Certificates
Persiano et al. [13] describes crypto certificates as a way to disclose X.509v3

certificate extensions selectively by using public key cryptography to conceal the value
stored in an extension. When the credential is issued, each sensitive attribute value is
encrypted using the CA’s public key, with the resulting cipher text stored in the
certificate. No one can determine the original value from the cipher text unless they
obtain the CA’s private key. In order for a relying party to obtain reliably the sensitive
attribute value, the certificate owner must disclose that value along with the certificate.
The relying party can encrypt the value using the CA’s public key and compare it to the
cipher text stored in the certificate. If they match, the relying party accepts the attribute
value disclosed by the owner as valid.
The proposal for crypto certificates does not mention anything about RSA padding.
In order for crypto certificates to work as currently specified, no random padding can be
added during RSA encryption. Otherwise, the relying party will not be able to generate
the same cipher text for the attribute value that the CA generated. However, without
random padding, the design is susceptible to dictionary attacks. Our approach to
generating pre-images for private attributes could be adopted to prevent dictionary
attacks against crypto certificates. In addition, the privacy features of private attributes
are similar to crypto certificates, but at a reduced cost, since private attributes rely on
one-way hashes instead of public key encryption.
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6.2.

Private Credentials
Brands [2] introduced Private Credentials, which are able to support anonymous,

one-time-use credentials that cannot be traced to their owners. Private Credentials also
support the selective disclosure of credential attributes and further support attribute
disclosures that reveal certain properties of the attribute without revealing the actual
value. For example, the credential owner could reveal that his or her age is over 18
without revealing an actual age.
Private Credentials are based on a new public key cryptography system that relies
primarily on modular arithmetic, blinding factors, and mathematical proofs. The private
key is a set of attributes [a1…an] and a chosen blinding factor s. The associated public
key is the product of selected bases - a set of CA’s public values (b1…bk, h) - raised to
the respective values of the private key (b1a1*…* bnan * hs). Because the public key
mathematically includes the private key, the attributes in the private key are bound to the
credential when the CA signs the public key. Credential holders can reveal their
attributes selectively through proofs of knowledge using their private credential, the CA’s
signature, and public bases. This gives users fine-grained access control over the
information in their Private Credentials. More technical details on Brand’s private
credentials can be found in [2]. Private Credentials are patented, and we are not aware of
any publicly available implementation.
Like private attributes, Private Credentials can also be embedded as an extension in
an X.509v3 certificate. Although this preserves the selective disclosure capabilities of
Private Credentials, the anonymity and unlinkability properties inherent in Private
Credentials are sacrificed because of the signatures contained in an X.509 certificate. In
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order to process Private Credentials, both parties in a transaction must support its public
key cryptography system. In contrast, private attributes leverage existing hashing and
public key cryptography standards, such as SHA-1 and RSA.
Private attributes support the selective disclosure of credential attributes. The design
of private attributes presented in this thesis does not provide the sophisticated privacy
properties of Private Credentials, including anonymity, untracability, and the ability to
disclose certain information about an attribute value without disclosing the exact value.
Private attributes are suitable for use in transactions that do not permit anonymity and the
user trusts the server to handle the private information that is disclosed appropriately,
such as in certain kinds of financial and medical transactions. In the future, we plan to
experiment with Private Credentials in trust negotiation as soon as implementations
become available.
6.3.

Database Pointer
Renfro [15] proposes to protect the sensitive attributes of a certificate by placing the

sensitive attributes in a centralized database and storing a database index for each
attribute within the credential. The database’s access control mechanism handles the
selective disclosure of private information. Only those who are authorized by the
database can gain access to the attributes. One advantage of this approach is being able
to change the value of attributes in the database without re-issuing the credential. This
would ease many burdens associated with managing information that may change
frequently. In addition, to protect the integrity of an attribute, Renfro mentions that a hash
of the attribute could be stored in the credential.

45

Using a database pointer approach, trust negotiation could be adopted to authenticate
relying parties to the centralized database in open systems. The authorization required to
access attributes from the database depends upon the database’s access control
mechanism, which will not give a user direct control over which or when sensitive
information is disclosed.
6.4.

Smart Certificates
Park and Sandhu [12] propose Smart Certificates and Secure Attribute Services on the

web. They introduce the concept of an “attribute server” which is maintained by an
attribute authority and issues attributes for users within the domain. Using this attribute
server, users or servers can pull the appropriate attributes, verify them, and use them for
their purposes, such as access control or authorization. The security of the attributes is
dependent on the attribute server providing them securely to the Web server or user. In
the server-pull architecture, the user would only have to provide authentication
information and simply reference the attribute server where the user’s attributes could be
accessed. User-pull architecture allows the user to present her own attributes to
whomever after downloading them from the attribute server. Smart Certificates allow
sensitive information within the certificates to be encrypted, and then subsequently
decrypted using an appropriate server private key or shared secret key. Smart Certificates
and the Secure Attribute Services provide confidentiality of attributes as well as attribute
level access control.
Smart Certificates allow symmetric or asymmetric encryption to provide
confidentiality of sensitive attributes. Either way, the decryption using a server’s private
key or server’s shared secret key would require that an intended recipient or server be
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explicitly known at the time the attribute is encrypted. In many applications, the intended
recipients are not known prior to the transactions. In addition, any use of public key
cryptography for encrypting and decryption attributes may carry significant performance
costs.
Although it is possible to use Secure Attribute Services for selectively disclosing
attribute information to others, if the server-pull architecture is used, the access control
decision rests with the attribute server and not the owner of the attributes. The user-pull
architecture is more preferable for privacy protection since the access control of attributes
may be governed by the user, but currently would require user interaction unlike the
automation of access control provided by TrustBuilder using private attributes.
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CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We presented an approach for protecting sensitive credential content during trust
negotiation and demonstrated, through a design and an implementation, the privacy
benefits that can be achieved with selective disclosure. Private attributes, created using a
well-known technique incorporating bit commitments within digital credentials, are a
simple and elegant way to achieve selective disclosure. This thesis is the first to explore
this technique in detail and to provide a working implementation of selective disclosure
in trust negotiation. Private attributes have the potential to impact all applications that
process digital credentials because they can be easily integrated within standard X.509v3
certificates. A proof-of-concept implementation of private attributes was incorporated
into TrustBuilder, an implementation of trust negotiation under development in the
Internet Security Research Lab (ISRL) at BYU. The resulting implementation gives
credential owners the ability to determine when and to whom sensitive information
within their credentials is disclosed. This level of privacy control eliminates certain risks
associated with exchanging credentials, including the excessive gathering of information
that is not germane to the transaction, and inadvertently disclosing the value of a sensitive
credential attribute. With access control at the attribute level, TrustBuilder gives users
greater control over their private information and can improve the success rate of
negotiations.
Future work includes implementing support for private attributes within TrustBuilder
using a negotiation strategy that exchanges policies and incorporating Private Credentials
into trust negotiation for enhanced privacy during transactions. We also intend to study
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the impact of private attributes on policy languages for trust negotiation, the impact of
private attributes on trust negotiation protocols such as TNT [7], and incorporating
private attributes within forthcoming XML credential formats. In addition, we will
explore ways to extend the design of private attributes to include advanced privacy
guarantees like anonymity, one-time-use credentials, and approximate query matching.
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CHAPTER 8:

APPENDIX

8.1.

Scenario Data

8.1.1

TrustBuilder Configuration Files

SERVER XML FILE FOR TRUSTBUILDER
<CONFIG>
<VAULT NAME="GENERICVAULT"/>
<CREDENTIALS>
<CRED NAME="JoeSmithSelfSigned" SELF="true"
SRC="demo/Certs/JoeSmithSelfSigned.cer" SUPPORTING="true"/>
<CRED NAME="University" SRC="demo/Certs/BYU.cer"
SUPPORTING="false"/>
<CRED NAME="Student" SRC="demo/Certs/me.cer" SUPPORTING="false">
<PREIMAGE Name="Status" SRC="demo/Preimages/me.txt"
OID="1.2.3.6.1">
<POLICY>Company</POLICY>
</PREIMAGE>
</CRED>
<CRED NAME="BBB" SRC="demo/Certs/BBB.cer" SUPPORTING="true"/>
</CREDENTIALS>
<DECISIONENGINE NAME="TE">
<DECISIONENGINE_SUPPORT NAME="INI"
SRC="demo/Config/Student_TPServer.ini"/>
<DECISIONENGINE_SUPPORT NAME="POLICY" SRC="demo/Policy/studentpolicy.xml"/>
</DECISIONENGINE>
<OUTPUT NAME="File" CLASS="edu.byu.cs.isrl.output.FileOutput"/>
<STRATEGIES>
<FAMILY NAME="DTS" DEFAULT="EAGERSTRATEGY">
<STRATEGY NAME="INFORMEDSTRATEGY"
CLASS="edu.byu.cs.isrl.TrustBuilderHTTP.strategies.Informed
"/>
<STRATEGY NAME="EAGERSTRATEGY"
CLASS="edu.byu.cs.isrl.TrustBuilderHTTP.strategies.Eager"/>
</FAMILY>
</STRATEGIES>
</CONFIG>
CLIENT XML FILE FOR TRUSTBUILDER
<CONFIG>
<SERVICES>
<SERVICE NAME="/order/books">
<POLICY>Student</POLICY>
</SERVICE>
</SERVICES>
<VAULT NAME="GENERICVAULT"/>
<CREDENTIALS>
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<CRED NAME="AcmeBooksSelfSigned"
SRC="demo/Certs/AcmeBooksSelfSigned.cer"
SUPPORTING="true"/>
<CRED NAME="AcmeBooks" SRC="demo/Certs/AcmeBooks.cer"
SUPPORTING="false"/>
<CRED NAME="ABET" SRC="demo/Certs/ABET.cer"
SUPPORTING="true"/>
</CREDENTIALS>
<DECISIONENGINE NAME="TE">
<DECISIONENGINE_SUPPORT NAME="INI"
SRC="demo/Config/Store_TPServer.ini"/>
<DECISIONENGINE_SUPPORT NAME="POLICY" SRC="demo/Policy/storepolicy-custom-function.xml"/>
</DECISIONENGINE>
<OUTPUT NAME="File" CLASS="edu.byu.cs.isrl.output.FileOutput"/>
<STRATEGIES>
<FAMILY NAME="DTS" DEFAULT="EAGERSTRATEGY">
<STRATEGY NAME="INFORMEDSTRATEGY"
CLASS="edu.byu.cs.isrl.TrustBuilderHTTP.strategies.Informed
"/>
<STRATEGY NAME="EAGERSTRATEGY"
CLASS="edu.byu.cs.isrl.TrustBuilderHTTP.strategies.Eager"/>
</FAMILY>
</STRATEGIES>
</CONFIG>

8.1.2

IBM TE Configuration Files

SERVER TE CONFIGURATION FILE
#TP Configuration
#Tue May 12 17:05:00 GMT+03:00 1998
Name=Acme Books
OrgUnit=Acme Retailers
Org=Acme Enterprises
Country=USA
Description=Acme Book Store
Port=2573
Policy=demo/Policy/store-policy-custom-function.xml
CertTypes=demo/Config/CertTypes.ini
Keys=demo/Vaults/store.key
DB=demo/Certs/CertDb_Store.txt
CrlDir=demo/Certs
VaultsDir=demo/Vaults
DescriptionUrl=http://isrl.cs.byu.edu
DebugLevel=1
Password=xxx
#
#To work with a flat file set Ldap=No and DB2=No
#
Ldap=No
DB2=No
#
DbHost=jdbc:db2:trust
#
DB2User=db2admin
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DB2Password=webibm
#
CollectCerts=No
CollectCrls=No
CLIENT TE CONFIGURATION FILE
#TP Configuration
#Tue May 12 17:05:00 GMT+03:00 1998
Name=Joe Smith
OrgUnit=Student
Org=Brigham Young University
Country=USA
Description=BYU Student
Port=2574
Policy=demo/Policy/student-policy.xml
CertTypes=demo/Config/CertTypes.ini
Keys=demo/Vaults/student.key
DB=demo/Certs/CertDb_Student.txt
CrlDir=demo/Certs
VaultsDir=demo/Vaults
DescriptionUrl=http://isrl.cs.byu.edu
DebugLevel=1
Password=xxx
#
#To work with a flat file set Ldap=No and DB2=No
#
Ldap=No
DB2=No
#
DbHost=jdbc:db2:trust
#
DB2User=db2admin
DB2Password=webibm
#
CollectCerts=No
CollectCrls=No

8.1.3

IBM TPL Policies

SERVER TPL POLICY
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self">
<!--TP-COORD=(10,30)-->
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="AccreditingBody">
<!--TP-COORD=(10,100)-->
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="self" ID="accreditingbodycert"
TYPE="AccreditingBody">
<!--TP-COORD=(0,0)-->
</INCLUSION>
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</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="University">
<!--TP-COORD=(10,200)-->
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="AccreditingBody" ID="universitycert"
TYPE="University">
<!--TP-COORD=(0,0)-->
</INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="Student">
<!--TP-COORD=(10,300)-->
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="University" ID="studentcert" TYPE="Student"/>
<FUNCTION>
<EXTERN CLASS="PrivateAttributeExternalFunction">
<PARAM NAME="privateAttribute">
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="Status"/>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="OID">
<CONST>1.2.3.6.1</CONST>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="subjectName">
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="subjectName"/>
</PARAM>
<PARAM NAME="issuerName">
<FIELD ID="studentcert" NAME="issuerName"/>
</PARAM>
</EXTERN>
</FUNCTION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
</POLICY>\

CLIENT TPL POLICY
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE POLICY SYSTEM "Policy.dtd">
<POLICY>
<GROUP NAME="self"></GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="AccreditingBody">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="self" ID="accreditingbodycert"
TYPE="AccreditingBody"></INCLUSION>
</RULE>
</GROUP>
<GROUP NAME="Company">
<RULE>
<INCLUSION FROM="AccreditingBody" ID="trustedbiz"
TYPE="Store"></INCLUSION>
</RULE>
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</GROUP>
</POLICY>

8.2.

Source Code

8.2.1

Pre-image Creator Tool

/*
* PrivateAttributeCreator.java
*
* Created on February 24, 2003, 1:51 PM
*/
/**
*
* @author rjarvis
*/
import java.security.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.io.*;
public class PrivateAttributeCreator {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String Value = "";
try{
if(args[0] == null){
System.out.println("Please specify Attribute Value
file as an argument");
System.exit(1);
}
if(args[1] == null){
String PreimageFile = args[0].trim();
Value = readPreimageFromFile(PreimageFile);
}
else{
String TEST_FILE_LEN = args[1].trim();
Value = "";
//System.out.println("Integer Read in :" + TEST_FILE_LEN);
int len = ((Integer) new Integer(TEST_FILE_LEN)).intValue();
//System.out.println("Integer Read in :" + len);
for(int x=0; x<(len/2); x++){
Value += "AA";
}
}
System.out.println("Length of Attribute Value in
Characters: " + Value.length());
//Create Random String
Date randDate1 = new Date();
SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG");
random.setSeed((new Date().getTime()));
byte bytes[] = new byte[20];
random.nextBytes(bytes);
String randomStr = new String(bytes);
randomStr = new String(Base64.encode(bytes));
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// System.out.println("Size of randomStr = " +
randomStr.length());
//
//Create the Preimage
String preimage = Value + ":" + randomStr.substring(0, 20);
Date randDate2 = new Date();
System.out.println("Preimage created in Time:" +
(randDate2.getTime()-randDate1.getTime()));
//
//Save the Preimage to File
writeDataToFile("preimage.txt", preimage);
//Create the Digest
long time;
Date randDate3 = new Date();
String encodedDigest = "";
for(int i=0; i<1000; i++){
MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
md.update(preimage.getBytes());
byte[] digest = md.digest();
encodedDigest = new String(Base64.encode(digest));
}
Date randDate4 = new Date();
time = (randDate4.getTime() - randDate3.getTime());
System.out.println("Preimage Digest created: " +
encodedDigest + " in Time:" + time);
//Save the Digest to File
writeDataToFile("digest.txt", encodedDigest);
}
catch(Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
System.exit(0);
}

}
private static void writeDataToFile(String srcFile, String data){
try{
File file = new File(srcFile);
BufferedWriter buff;
file.delete();
file.createNewFile();
buff = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(file));
buff.write(data);
buff.close();
}
catch(Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
System.exit(0);
}
}
private static String readPreimageFromFile(String srcFile){
String returnStr = "";
try{
File file = new File(srcFile);
BufferedReader buff;
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if(!file.exists()){
System.out.println("File NOT FOUND!");
System.exit(1);
}
buff = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(file));
returnStr = buff.readLine();
buff.close();

}

8.2.2

}
catch(Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
System.exit(0);
}
return returnStr;
}

IBM TE External Function

/*
* PrivateAttributeExternalFunction.java
*
* Created on February 5, 2003, 6:01 AM
*/
import edu.byu.cs.isrl.trustbuilder.TrustBuilder;
import com.ibm.trust.policy.*;
import java.security.*;
import java.util.*;
/**
*
* @author rjarvis
* @version 1.0
*/
public class PrivateAttributeExternalFunction implements
com.ibm.trust.policy.TPExternalFunction {
public String
public String
public String
public String
public String
Date Timer;

subjectName;
issuerName;
OID;
Value;
privateAttribute;

/** Creates new TPCompareTest */
public PrivateAttributeExternalFunction() {
System.out.println("Private Attribute External Function
Evaluation...");
subjectName = "";
issuerName = "";
OID = "";
privateAttribute = "";
}
public int checkParam(java.lang.String str, java.lang.String
str1) {
return LEGAL_PARAM;
}
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public boolean eval() throws
com.ibm.trust.policy.TPExternalFunction$TPEvalException {
boolean returnval = false;
String preimage =
TrustBuilder.sessionTable.getCertificatePreimage(subjectNam
e, issuerName, OID);
String attributeValue = extractValueFromPreimage(preimage);
try {
//Date t = new Date();
MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
md.update(preimage.getBytes());
byte[] digest = md.digest();
String output = new String(Base64.encode(digest));
String output2 = privateAttribute;
int result = output2.compareTo(output.trim());
if (result == 0){
System.out.println("**** The Private Attribute
Verified****");
}
else{
System.out.println("!!!! PRIVATE ATTRIBUTE NOT
VERIFIED");
}
if(attributeValue.compareTo(Value) == 0)
//The Attribute extracted from preimage should equal
value passed in
returnval = true;
else returnval = false;
if (returnval){
System.out.println("**** The Private Attribute
Satisfied Policy ****");
}
else{
System.out.println("!!!! The Private Attribute DID
NOT Satisfy Policy !!!!");
}

}

}
catch (Exception ex) {
ex.printStackTrace();
}
return returnval;

public void setParam(java.lang.String str, java.lang.String str1)
{
if (Character.toLowerCase(str.charAt(0)) == 's'){
subjectName = str1;
//System.out.println("subject");
}else if (Character.toLowerCase(str.charAt(0)) == 'i'){
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issuerName = str1;
//System.out.println("issuer");
}else if (Character.toLowerCase(str.charAt(0)) ==
Value = str1;
//System.out.println("AttributeValue");
}else if (Character.toLowerCase(str.charAt(0)) ==
OID = str1;
//System.out.println("OID");
}else if (Character.toLowerCase(str.charAt(0)) ==
privateAttribute = str1;
//System.out.println("privateAttribute");
}else{
System.out.println("Not Recognized Parameter:
}

'v'){
'o'){
'p'){

" + str);

}
private String extractValueFromPreimage(String preimage) {
//Should have 20 bytes of random data
String value = preimage.substring(0, preimage.indexOf(':'));
return value;
}
}

8.2.3

TrustBuilder Internal Source Code

//PREIMAGE CLASS
package edu.byu.cs.isrl.trustbuilder;
import java.util.*;
import com.ibm.trust.certificate.*;
/*
* Preimage.java
*
* Created on Feb 5, 2003, 9:41 AM
*/
/** This class is essentially a data store for preimages.
* @author rjarvis
* @version
*/
public class Preimage
{
/** Holds value of property preimage. */
private String preimage = null;
/** Holds value of property credName. */
private String credName = null;
/** Holds value of property OID. */
private String OID = null;
/** Holds value of property preImageString. */
private String preImageString = null;
public Preimage()
{
}
public Preimage(String preimageData){
//Parse Preimage Data
final String fNAME = "NAME:";
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final String fOID = "OID:";
final String fDATA = "DATA:";
int index1 = 0, index2 = 0;
String temp1 = preimageData, temp2 = "";
preImageString = preimageData;
index1 = preimageData.indexOf(fNAME)+ fNAME.length();
index2 = preimageData.indexOf(fOID);
credName = preimageData.substring(index1,index2);
index1 = index2 + fOID.length();
index2 = preimageData.indexOf(fDATA);
OID = preimageData.substring(index1, index2);
index1 = index2 + fDATA.length();
preimage = preimageData.substring(index1);
}
public String toString(){
return "\tCredName: "+ credName + "\n\tOID: " + OID + "\n\tPreimage:" + preimage;
}
/** Getter for property preImageString.
* @return preImage.
*/
public String getPreImageString()
{
return preImageString;
}
/** Setter for property preImageString.
* @param cred New value of property preImageString.
*/
public void setPreImageString()
{
this.preImageString = "NAME:" + credName + "OID:" + OID + "DATA:"
+ preimage;
}
/** Getter for property preImage.
* @return preImage.
*/
public String getPreimage()
{
return preimage;
}
/** Setter for property preimage.
* @param cred New value of property preimage.
*/
public void setPreimage(String preimage)
{
this.preimage = preimage;
}
/** Getter for property OID.
* @return OID.
*/
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public String getOID()
{
return OID;
}
/** Setter for property OID.
* @param cred New value of property OID.
*/
public void setOID(String OID)
{
this.OID = OID;
}
/** Getter for property credName.
* @return OID.
*/
public String getCredName()
{
return credName;
}

}

/** Setter for property credName.
* @param cred New value of property credName.
*/
public void setCredName(String credName)
{
this.credName = credName;
}

STATIC METHOD FOR ACCESSING PREIMAGES
public String getCertificatePreimage(String subject, String issuer,
String OID){
String preimage = "";
Set keys = super.keySet();
for(Iterator iter = keys.iterator(); iter.hasNext();)
{
String keyValue = (String)iter.next();
Session s = (Session)super.get(keyValue);
Iterator Creds = s.getRecvCredsIterator();
while(Creds.hasNext()){
TPCertificate cred = ((TPX509Certificate)Creds.next());
String issuerStr = cred.getIssuer().getUniqueName();
String subjectStr = cred.getSubject().getUniqueName();
if(issuerStr.compareTo(issuer) == 0 &&
subjectStr.compareTo(subject)== 0){
String hashedCredName =
TrustBuilder.doMD5Hash(cred.dumpToStringBase64NOLF(
));
Iterator Preimages = s.getRecvPreimagesIterator();
while(Preimages.hasNext()){
Preimage preIMG = (Preimage)Preimages.next();
if(preIMG.getCredName().compareTo(hashedCredNam
e) == 0){
if(preIMG.getOID().compareTo(OID) == 0){
return preIMG.getPreimage();
}
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}

}

8.2.4

}

}

}

}
return preimage;

TrustBuilder Test Interfaces

/**
* @author jarvis
*/
import java.io.*;
import com.ibm.trust.common.*;
import com.ibm.trust.TPServer.*;
import com.ibm.trust.certificate.*;
import com.ibm.trust.policy.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.net.*;
import edu.byu.cs.isrl.trustbuilder.*;
import edu.byu.cs.isrl.trustbuilder.util.*;
public class TrustTest_Client extends Thread implements TPCodes {
public static void main(String[] args) {
int result = 0;
String pathToDemo = "demo/";
String strFailed = "Failed to accept certificate ";
String configFileURI = pathToDemo +
"config/StudentConfig.xml";
String preimage = "";
Vector newCreds = new Vector();
Vector newPreImages = new Vector();
Vector newPolicies = new Vector();
if(args[0] == null){
System.out.println("Please specify argument s for soap and
ns for so soap");
System.exit(1);
}
try {
if(Character.toLowerCase(args[0].charAt(0)) =='s'){
TrustBuilderSOAP tb = new TrustBuilderSOAP(new
URL("http://localhost:4041/soap/servlet/rpcrouter"));
tb.init(configFileURI);
SessionID id = tb.generateID();
SessionID bogusId = tb.generateID();
String AcmeCert = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIICijCCAjSgAwIBAgIBDjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBxMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpCQkIgT25saW5
lMR8wHQYDVQQLExZCZXR0ZXIgQnVzaW5lc3MgQnVyZWF1MSswKQYDVQQKEyJDb3VuY2lsIG
9mIEJldHRlciBCdXNpbmVzcyBCdXJlYXVzMQwwCgYDVQQGEwNVU0EwHhcNMDIwODIzMTcyM
DEzWhcNMDMwODIzMTcyMDEzWjBXMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpBY21lIEJvb2tzMRcwFQYDVQQLEw5B
Y21lIFJldGFpbGVyczEZMBcGA1UEChMQQWNtZSBFbnRlcnByaXNlczEMMAoGA1UEBhMDVVN
BMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAJAjzKr5b3s5Y7KqLRZzne30HsUbUmRaEv42td
cHWgDn/clacEzephtqZG54yyaz55WnlfqNMQgJMat+S+nDMyMCAwEAAaOB0DCBzTAjBgNVH
RIEHDAaghhJb3U4Umt5MzlRRW9sYjhYWkZQd2J3PT0wIwYDVR0RBBwwGoIYOWpjVGRtSlo2
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WjdWVXpad2huaG5tQT09MA0GBCoDBAEEBVN0b3JlMBAGBCoDBAIECFZlcnNpb24xMB4GBCo
DBAMEFmh0dHA6Ly9pc3JsLmNzLmJ5dS5lZHUwEwYEKgMEBAQLV0lDS0VUOjI1NzMwEwYEKg
MEBQQLV0lDS0VUOjI1NzMwFgYEKgMGAQQOQWNtZSBCb29rc3RvcmUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEB
QADQQBNgc3SjncUibqX1VkktAYJdlMtgeSE52Z1W0c8uK9kKe4NWECQlp7OCWHHTeED6B/7
LEGe6V/v8AH3Ucsm9mr1-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
System.out.println("\n ***** ROUND ONE ****** \n");
System.out.println("Joe requests the bookstore student
discount from AcmeBooks.com, an online bookstore... ");
System.out.println("\n ***** ROUND TWO ****** \n");
newCreds.removeAllElements();
System.out.println("Server negotiates using the Eager
Strategy \n sends his publically available
Certificates/Preimages");
newCreds.add(AcmeCert);
NegotiationResponse nr = tb.negotiate(newCreds,
newPolicies, newPreImages, id);
System.out.println("\n>>>>>>>>>>>\tJoe Sends to Server:
\n>>>>>>>>>>>\t");
System.out.println("Number of Preimages: " +
nr.getPreImagesToDisclose().size());
printCredVector(nr.getCredsToDisclose());
printPreimageVector(nr.getPreImagesToDisclose());
if(!nr.isAuthenticated()){
System.out.println("\nTrust requirements not met,
continuing Trust Negotiation...");
}
else{
System.out.println("\n\tTrust requirements
met!\n\tTrust Negotiation Succeeded! \n");
}
}else{
TrustBuilder tb = new TrustBuilder();
tb.init(configFileURI);
SessionID id = tb.generateID();
SessionID bogusId = tb.generateID();
String AcmeCert = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIICijCCAjSgAwIBAgIBDjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBxMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpCQkIgT25saW5-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
System.out.println("\n ***** ROUND ONE ****** \n");
System.out.println("Joe requests the bookstore student
discount from AcmeBooks.com, an online bookstore... ");
System.out.println("\n ***** ROUND TWO ****** \n");
newCreds.removeAllElements();
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System.out.println("Server negotiates using the Eager
Strategy \n sends his publically available
Certificates/Preimages");
newCreds.add(AcmeCert);
NegotiationResponse nr = tb.negotiate(newCreds,
newPolicies, newPreImages, id);
System.out.println("\n>>>>>>>>>>>\tJoe Sends to Server:
\n>>>>>>>>>>>\t");
System.out.println("Number of Preimages: " +
nr.getPreImagesToDisclose().size());
printCredVector(nr.getCredsToDisclose());
printPreimageVector(nr.getPreImagesToDisclose());
if(!nr.isAuthenticated()){
System.out.println("\nTrust requirements not met,
continuing Trust Negotiation...");
}
else{
System.out.println("\n\tTrust requirements
met!\n\tTrust Negotiation Succeeded! \n");
}

}

8.2.5

}
catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
System.exit(1);
}
}
public static void printCredVector(Vector Vstring){
try{
System.out.println("\n\tCredentials Received:");
for(int i=0; i < Vstring.size(); i++){
//TPCertificate myTempCert =
TPX509Certificate.loadCertFromString((String)Vstring.elemen
tAt(i));
System.out.println(Vstring.elementAt(i));
}
}catch(Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
public static void printPreimageVector(Vector Vstring){
try{
System.out.println("\n\tPREIMAGES Received:");
for(int i=0; i < Vstring.size(); i++){
System.out.println(Vstring.elementAt(i).toString());
}
}catch(Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
}

TrustBuilder Eager Strategy Code

/*
* EagerStrategy.java
*
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* Created on May 16, 2002, 1:45 PM
*/
package edu.byu.cs.isrl.trustbuilder;
import java.util.*;
import com.ibm.trust.certificate.*;
/**
*
* @author bsmith, rjarvis
*/
public class EagerStrategy implements Strategy {
Vault vault = null;
/** Creates a new instance of EagerStrategy */
public EagerStrategy(Vault v) {
this.vault = v;
}
public NegotiationResponse runStrategy(Session sessionData,
AccessControl accessControl, DecisionEngine decisionEngine)
{
return runStrategyMethod(sessionData, accessControl,
decisionEngine, null);
}
public NegotiationResponse runStrategy(Session sessionData,
AccessControl accessControl, DecisionEngine decisionEngine,String
resource)
{
return runStrategyMethod(sessionData, accessControl,
decisionEngine, resource);
}
/** places all unlocked credentials in the Negotiation class
*/
private NegotiationResponse runStrategyMethod(Session
sessionData, AccessControl accessControl, DecisionEngine
decisionEngine, String resource){
NegotiationResponse nr = new NegotiationResponse();
Vector aRoles = new Vector(sessionData.getAuthenticatedRoles());
Vector OIDs = new Vector();
if(resource != null){
// check if resource is protected
RoleExpression resourceExpr = (RoleExpression)
accessControl.get(resource);
//System.out.println(resourceExpr);
if (resourceExpr.Evaluate(aRoles))
nr.setAuthenticated(true);
}
// find unlocked credentials
Enumeration keys = accessControl.keys();
while (keys.hasMoreElements()) {
Object key = keys.nextElement();
//System.out.println("Key:\t" + (String)key);
RoleExpression credExpr = (RoleExpression)
accessControl.get(key);
//System.out.println(credExpr);
if (credExpr.Evaluate(aRoles)) {

69

if(isOID((String)key)){
OIDs.add((String)key);
//System.out.println("OID ADDED: " + (String)key);
sessionData.addToUnlockedPreimages((String)key);
}
else{
TPX509Certificate cred =
(TPX509Certificate)vault.getCred((String)key);
if(cred == null) continue;
nr.addToCredsToDisclose(cred.dumpToStringBase64NOLF());
sessionData.addToUnlockedCreds(key);
sessionData.addToDisclosedCreds(key);
}

}
}
Iterator UnlockedCreds = sessionData.getUnlockedCredsIterator();
while(UnlockedCreds.hasNext()){
String CredName = (String)UnlockedCreds.next();
for(int i=0; i < OIDs.size(); i++){
String PreimageStr = vault.getPreimage(CredName,
((String)OIDs.elementAt(i)));
if(PreimageStr != null){
nr.addToPreImagesToDisclose(PreimageStr);
sessionData.addToDisclosedPreimages(PreimageStr);
}
}
}
// System.out.println("In Eager Strategy!");
return nr;

}
public boolean isOID(String s){
//Verify that the string contains number.number format
boolean firstCharISADigit = Character.isDigit(s.charAt(0));
int index = s.indexOf(".");
if(firstCharISADigit && index > 0)
return true;
return false;
}
}
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